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I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2004, the group American Veterans Standing
for God and Country ("American Veterans") began a cross-country
pilgrimage to carry a 5,200-pound statue of the Ten Commandments
to Washington D.C.1 The infamous statue cost Roy Moore his job as

1. Monte Reel, Artifact of the Culture Wars En Route From Alabama, WASH. POST, July 25,
2004, at C4.
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Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court when he refused to
remove it from the lobby of the state courthouse in 2002.2 American
Veterans took up Moore's cause, however, and in October they brought
the Commandments statue to a Christian rally in Washington, D.C. 3
The group then planned to ask Congress to display the statue
permanently in the Capitol Building. 4 The president of American
Veterans also joined Moore in a campaign to enact legislation that
would prohibit the Supreme Court from reviewing cases involving any
government official's "acknowledgement of God as the sovereign
source of law, liberty, or government." 5 As Moore explained in his
recent book, "elected and appointed government officials have the
right and obligation to acknowledge God as the foundation of
6
American government."
At least one observer has likened the campaign of American
Veterans to that of the biblical David, who planned to establish a
theocracy and use the religious law of Israel to unify his nation. 7
concerns.
For example, the superintendent of a Missouri school
district was put "on leave" for refusing to remove a plaque of the Ten
Commandments from a local public school and a cross and a Bible
from his office. 8 Roy Moore supported the superintendent, claiming
that "God gives [him] [the] right" to display such items. 9
Former-Justice Moore and his affiliates are not alone in
suggesting that local governments and government officials should be
allowed to display religious symbols in an official context or to make
religion an official part of public life. Some jurists have suggested
similar changes in church-state relations as they currently stand. For
example, Chief District Judge Brevard Hand ruled in a 1983 decision
that the Establishment Clause was not intended to apply to state
governments and did not prohibit public school teachers from offering
prayers in school.' 0

2.
Id.
3.
Mary Orndorff, Atheists Jeer as Monument Hits D.C., BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Oct. 23, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Birmingham News.
4.
Reel, supra note 1, at C4. As Moore explained, "[fthis monument needs to be in this
building." Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Fall 2004 Hardcovers, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Aug. 9, 2004, at 138, 184.

7.

Steve Gushee, Commandments Heading Down a Dangerous Path, PALM BEACH POST,

Aug. 20, 2004.
8.
Andrew Tangel, Humansville School Chief Out of a Job, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER,
Aug. 20, 2004, availableat 2004 WLNR 16256895.

9.

Id.

10. Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983), stay granted,
459 U.S. 1314 (1983).
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More recently, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Justice Thomas
suggested in his concurrence that the Court should treat the federal
and state governments differently when faced with Establishment
Clause challenges. 1 ' He reasoned: "On its face, [the Establishment
Clause] places no limit on the States with regard to religion. The
Establishment Clause originally protected States, and by extension
their citizens, from the imposition of an established religion by the
Federal Government." 12 Thus, Justice Thomas asserted: "[A]s a
matter of first principles, I question whether ... [the Court's current
Establishment Clause] test should be applied to the States . . . [I]n the
context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action
should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by the
Federal Government."' 3
Justice Thomas's proposal, if adopted, would represent a
dramatic shift in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence as it
presently stands. Since 1947, the Establishment Clause has been
incorporated
against state
action through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 14 and the Court has used the Clause to invalidate
15
numerous state laws and acts as unconstitutional.
Although a number of judges and scholars have proposed that
the Establishment Clause be unincorporated,16 it remains unclear how
the change would affect state action. Some commentators have
predicted that state judges would be able to commence jury sessions
with prayer, 7 school boards would be allowed to institute formal
prayer in schools,' 8 and public school students could lead prayers at

11. 536 U.S. 639, 677-78 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 678.
13. Id. at 677-78.
14. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (upholding the Board of Education's
policy to reimburse bus fares for parochial and public school students against an Establishment
Clause challenge).
15. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (invalidating state
reimbursement of religious schools for salaries of teachers who instructed secular subjects);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973) (invalidating a
New York program that offered partial reimbursement of tuition costs to low income families and
a per-pupil tax credit to parents who sent their children to private schools); County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989) (enjoining a county from placing a creche in its
courthouse).
16. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1113-18 (S.D. Ala. 1983),
stay granted, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983); William P. Gray, Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten
Amendments: A Case Study in Religious Freedom in Alabama, 49 ALA. L. REV. 509, 510-511
(1998).
17. Gray, supra note 16, at 510.
18. Id. at 546; Note, Rethinking the Incorporationof the Establishment Clause:A Federalist
View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700, 1717-18 (1992).
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high school football games 19 and graduation ceremonies. 20 Other
commentators maintain that unincorporation would have little effect
on state action, which necessarily will be limited by the presence of a
variety of faiths, 21 state constitutional provisions protecting religion, 22
and the federal Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses. 23 These
protections, they argue, would guarantee religious freedom without
the Establishment Clause bar.
Part II of this Note will examine the historical context of the
arguments for and against unincorporation.
It will begin by
examining the history of the First Amendment and the state of
religion at the founding, when churches played a large role in the
states. Next, it will focus on the revolution that took place around the
time of the Civil War, when the nation's ideas of freedom changed
dramatically, and the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Finally,
Part II will examine the Court's current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and consider the wide scope of activities it prohibits.
The argument this Note makes is twofold. Part III of this Note
will demonstrate that, contrary to arguments suggesting that
unincorporation will have little impact on state action, proposed
alternative safeguards are insufficient to guarantee the religious
liberty currently protected by the Establishment Clause.
The
existence of religious majorities at the local level, the ability to amend
state constitutions, and the standing problems associated with
religious claims will make it difficult to protect against state
establishment with any real force should the Establishment Clause be
unincorporated.
Second, this Note will argue that widespread state
establishment is inconsistent with the vision of religious freedom and
democratic government put forth in the federal Constitution. To do so,
Part IV will examine the phenomenon of government speech: the
government's insertion of its own preferences and values into the
marketplace of ideas. This Note argues that recognized problems of
general government expression are particularly troubling in the
context of religion. In light of these concerns, the Establishment
Clause is properly applied to state action and should remain
incorporated.
19. See Gray, supra note 16, at 515 (concluding that the First Amendment does not apply to
the states).
20. Id.; see also Note, supra note 18, at 1718-19 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
overturn Everson and find that the First Amendment does not apply to the states).
21. Note, supra note 18, at 1718.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part III.C.
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II: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Religious "Freedom"in the Eighteenth Century
Although some individuals may think the United States has
been a bastion of religious freedom since its founding, recent scholarly
work reveals religious establishment in the eighteenth century that
would be quite shocking to citizens today. 24 During the founding era,
it was common for states to promote particular religions. In 1789, at
least six of the original thirteen states supported churches with
government funds. 25 Four of the remaining seven had constitutional
provisions that barred non-Protestants or non-Christians from holding
office. 26
As now-Judge Michael McConnell explains, "No small
number of the 'freedom-loving colonials' considered official sanction for
religion natural and essential." 27 The web of laws protecting against
establishment at the time of the founding was, at best, "ad hoc and
28
unsystematic."
Based on the states' established churches and religious
requirements for office, some commentators have suggested that the
First Amendment was intended to prohibit not only the establishment
of religion but the disestablishment as well. 29 They note that the
Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from legislating with
"respect" to establishment, thus preventing Congress from
establishing its own church and from removing those state churches
already in place. Professor Akhil Amar explains: "Congress had no
more authority in the states to disestablish than to establish. Both
actions were equally beyond Congress's delegated powers; and the
unfettered choice between establishment and dis- was given to the
30
states."
Other evidence, however, suggests that many Framers were
concerned with religious establishment at the state level. One of the
proposed amendments prepared by James Madison prevented state

24.

See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

(1998); Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishmentof Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2108 (2003).
25. AMAR, supra note 24, at 32-33.
26. Id. at 33.
27. McConnell, supra note 24, at 2108.
28. Id. at 2131.
29. AMAR, supra note 24, at 32 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1965)).
30. Id. at 41.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:301

interference with "equal rights of conscience. 3 1 Madison himself
32
called this "the most valuable amendment in the whole list,"
explaining that "[i]f there was any reason to restrain the Government
of the United States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was
equally necessary that they should be secured against the State
Governments." 33
Madison expressed similar concerns in The
Federalist 10, where he drew the now-famous contrast between the
strength of factions in the nation as a whole and those in the state of
Rhode Island. 34 He concluded that factions were much more likely to
take hold of and trample minority rights in the tiny state than they
were in the federal government. 35 Madison's amendment, however,
36
did not prevail. It passed in the House, only to die in the Senate.
Thus, the Bill of Rights in its original form limited only federal
establishment of religion.
B. Reconstruction: The Second Revolution
Certainly, the history of the First Amendment offers some
insight into the original intent behind the Establishment Clause and
the federalist concerns that may have motivated it. Yet alone, that
history cannot offer a full understanding of the Establishment Clause
today. As Amar explains: "In the end, of course, the incorporation
question will ultimately depend on a careful examination of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, regardless of [the Establishment
Clause's] status in 1789." 37 The Civil War significantly altered both
the constitutional structure generally and the meaning of the
Establishment Clause in particular. The "very concept" of the Bill of
Rights was reshaped by the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 which provides:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."3 9 In order to understand whether the Establishment
Clause, or any other right, is properly incorporated against state

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77, 83-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Id.
AMAR, supra note 24, at 22.
Id. at 41.
Id. at xv.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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action, one must understand the meaning and purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Divining that meaning is no easy task. Although most
commentators recognize the amendment's significant impact on the
constitutional structure, judges and scholars have offered very
different interpretations of "privileges and immunities" and "due
process."4u The 1968 opinion Duncan v. Louisiana41 is illustrative of
the wide range of opinions in the incorporation debate. In Duncan,
the Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteed a jury trial in
criminal prosecutions involving two-year sentences. 43 The Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment provided such a right, although the
Justices disagreed upon how it did so.44 Justice White, writing for the
majority, framed the test for incorporation as "whether a right is
among those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions.' "45 The majority
found that a jury trial was such a protected right, properly
46
incorporated against the states.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred in the
majority's result but questioned its process.4 7 As explained in his
concurrence, Justice Black believed that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause incorporated the Bill of Rights in its
entirety: "[The Privileges and Immunities clause] seem[s] to me an
eminently reasonable way of expressing the idea that henceforth the
Bill of Rights shall apply to the States. . .. [A]ny [other] reading...
renders the words of this section of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
meaningless." 48 Thus, Justice Black rejected a fundamental fairness
test in favor of what often is called a "total incorporation" approach. 49
Under this approach, the Fourteenth Amendment would incorporate
the Establishment Clause, 50 as well as the rest of the Bill of Rights,
against state action.

40.
41.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
opinion

Id.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 149-150.
Id. at 148 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
Id. at 149-150.
Id. at 162-63 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 166 (Black, J., concurring).
AMAR, supra note 24, at 139.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). Justice Black wrote the majority
in Everson, which incorporated the Establishment Clause against state action. Id.
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C. The Incorporationof the Establishment Clause

The Supreme Court first applied the Establishment Clause to
state action in the 1947 case Everson v. Board of Education.51 In
Everson, the Court examined the constitutionality of a New Jersey
statute that used public funds to transport students to parochial
schools. 52 The majority explained that the challenge in such cases was
to distinguish between legislation "which provides funds for the
welfare of the general public and that which is designed to support
institutions that teach religion." 53 Ultimately, the Court upheld the
state law, reasoning that it was "neutral" in its treatment of religion
54
and nonreligion.
Contrary to the claims of some critics, 55 the Everson Court
offered several reasons for incorporating the Establishment Clause
against state action. First, the Court recognized that past decisions
had given "broad meaning" and scope to an individual's religious
freedom under the Free Exercise Clause.5 6 It found "every reason to
give the same application and broad interpretation" to the
Establishment Clause as well.5 7 This application was appropriate, the
Court next reasoned, because the two religion clauses are
"complementary."5 8 In order to preserve civil liberty, government
institutions must be "rescued" from religious interference, and
religious institutions must be protected from "invasion of the civil
authority." 5 9 Thus, the Everson Court recognized that the religious
liberty promised by the First Amendment could not be guaranteed
60
without protection against state, as well as national, establishment.

51. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id. at 18.
55. See, e.g., Note, supra note 18, at 1702 ("Significantly, Everson is devoid of any analysis
justifying the incorporation of the Establishment Clause under Palko's selective incorporation
test.").
56. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 15-16 ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.... [T]he clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a wall of separation between
Church and State.").
60. Id.
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D. A Modern Approach
More recently, Professor Amar has offered another approach to
incorporation in his book The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction. Under what he calls "refined incorporation," Amar
suggests that courts cannot mechanically apply provisions of the Bill
of Rights against the states. 6 1 Instead, he explains, "[t]he best reading
of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment suggests that it incorporates the Bill
of Rights in a far more subtle way than Black admitted, including both
more and less than the first eight amendments." 62 Amar notes the
argument that courts should distinguish between provisions in the
Bill of Rights that provide individual rights and those that are
designed to limit federal government power with regard to the
64
states. 63 The former may be incorporated against state action.
Those provisions designed to limit the federal government, however,
"may need to undergo refinement and filtration before their citizenrights elements can be absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment."6 5
Amar argues that the Establishment Clause was designed to
protect state freedom and thus cannot be incorporated in the same
way as the Free Exercise Clause, which guarantees individual
rights. 66 He finds mechanical incorporation of the Establishment
Clause to be "awkward." 67 He does not, however, end the inquiry
there. As noted above, Amar recognizes that the question of whether
the Establishment Clause should be incorporated depends heavily on
the transformation of thought that occurred at the time of the Civil
War and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 68
Unsurprisingly, state attitudes toward religion changed greatly
from the time of the nation's founding to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
While almost half of the states had
established churches in 1789, by the 1860s, no state had an
established religion. 69 As Joseph Henry Lumpkin, Chief Justice of the
Georgia Supreme Court, explained in an 1852 opinion:
Our revolutionary sires wisely resolved that religion should be purely voluntary in this
country; that it should subsist by its own omnipotence, or come to nothing ...Now, the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

AMAR, supra note 24, at xiv.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153.
Id. at xiv.
Id. at 33, 41.
Id. at 34.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
AMAR, supra note 24, at 251.
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doctrine is, that Congress may not exercise this power, but that each State Legislature
may do so for itself. As if a National religion and State religion ...were quite separate
and distinct from each other; and that the one might be subject to control, but the other
not!
70
Such logic, I must confess, fails to commend itself to my judgment.

Attitudes
toward
religion
and
government
changed
significantly between the time of the founding and the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom from religious establishment was
no longer a right limited to the states but had become a liberty of
individual citizens.
As such, one might conclude that the
Establishment Clause should be incorporated under the Fourteenth
Amendment like other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Yet Amar does not suggest that the Establishment Clause
should be incorporated as such. Instead, he suggests, the question of
whether the clause should be incorporated "may not matter all that
much. '71 As an example, Amar considers the question of whether
Utah could proclaim itself "the Mormon State" if the Court
unincorporated the Establishment Clause. 72 Utah's declaration would
be what Amar calls a "non-coercive establishment"-it does not force
individuals to participate in any religious exercise, but it clearly states
a government preference for a particular religion. 73 Amar ultimately
concludes that "even a non-coercive establishment" would violate
principles of religious liberty and equality; however, he believes these
values are adequately protected by other constitutional provisions,
such as the Free Exercise Clause. 74 Amar explains: "[S]o a law that
proclaimed Utah a Mormon state should be suspect whether we call
this a violation of the establishment principles, free-exercise
principles.., or religious-liberty principles. ' 76 He concludes: "[O]nce
we see this, it turns out that the question-should we incorporate the
' 77
establishment clause?-may not matter all that much.
Other commentators also have suggested that unincorporation
would have little effect. 78
Some believe that, regardless of any
constitutional provisions, the religious diversity now present in the

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
76.
77.
78.

Id. (quoting Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 366 (1852)).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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nation will guard against laws that establish a particular faith.7 9
Others turn to state constitutions to protect against religious
establishment.8 0 Still others believe that the Free Exercise Clause or
the Fourteenth Amendment would offer direct protection against
those violations that are so serious as to constitute a deprivation of
liberty generally. 81
In his Zelman concurrence, Justice Thomas suggests that state
laws dealing with religious matters would be constitutional only "so
long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other
individual religious liberty interest."8 2 However, Justice Thomas also
suggests that unincorporation would lead to an increase in state
decisions to "experiment" with religion.8 3 It is not clear what this
experimentation would entail or what experiments would pass
constitutional muster should the Establishment
Clause be
unincorporated.
Contrary to the suggestions of those scholars who believe
unincorporation will have little practical effect, Part III of this Note
argues that various proposed safeguards will not protect individuals
from state establishment. To understand what is at risk from
unincorporation, however, it is first necessary to examine how the
Establishment Clause functions today. Thus, the next Section will
study the extent to which state governments already have attempted
to promote particular religions and the Court's response under an
incorporated clause.
E. State Endorsements and Religious Displays
Through the years, the Supreme Court has faced many
challenges to state laws and actions claimed to be in violation of the
Establishment Clause. The main framework for handling these issues
was developed in the 1971 case Lemon v. Kurtzman.85 There, the
79. See Note, supra note 18, at 1717 ("Even without Everson, religious liberty would be
adequately preserved through mechanisms independent of the Establishment Clause, which
include. . . the presence of religious pluralism in America.").
80. See, e.g., Lisa S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing
Separationof Church and State Through State ConstitutionalProvisions,71 VA. L. REV. 625, 625
(1985) ("As long as states respect the federal Constitution as a minimum restraint on
government involvement with religion, they remain free to impose stricter limitations through
their own constitutions.").
81. Note, supra note 18, at 1717; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
82. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 679.
83. Id. at 678-79.
85. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Court consolidated suits 'challenging Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes that provided aid to religious schools. Seven Justices struck
down the states' programs under a new, three-pronged test developed
from past decisions: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "86 The
Lemon test has been applied in numerous contexts ranging from
religious school funding to tax deductions. 87
Courts have faced challenges to state action in the context of
local religious displays, as well.8 8 The Court decided its first major
holiday display case, Lynch v. Donnelly, in 1984.89 In Lynch, citizens
challenged the placement of a creche in the Pawtucket, Rhode Island,
Christmas display. 90 The City of Pawtucket erected a display of
decorations "traditionally associated with Christmas" each year in a
park owned by a nonprofit organization. 91 The display included,
among other objects, candy cane poles, a Christmas tree, a "Season's
Greetings" banner, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's
sleigh, and figures of a clown, elephant, and teddy bear. 92 Amid these
93
decorations, the display also contained the challenged nativity scene.
To
determine if the city's display constituted
an
unconstitutional establishment of religion, the Court conducted a brief
survey of its past Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 94 Eventually,
the majority concluded, "[i]n each case, the inquiry calls for line-

86. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
87. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-86, 489 (1986)
(rejecting claim that state aid flowing to religious school as part of a vocational rehabilitation
program violated the Establishment Clause under the facts presented); Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 393 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction against Establishment Clause
challenge).
88. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a city did not
impermissibly endorse religion by displaying a nativity scene); County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 601-02, 621 (1989) (holding the same with regard to the display of a Chanukah
menorah placed just outside the City-County building, but holding unconstitutional the display
of a nativity scene in the county courthouse).
89. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
90. Id. at 670-71.
91. Id. at 671.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 673-78 (noting Congress's approval of government paid chaplains for the
House and Senate, the government's recognition of "holidays with religious significance," the
national motto "In God We Trust," and presidential proclamations of days of national prayer).
97. Id. at 678.
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drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed." 97 The majority found
that the creche was but one of many parts of the display, and the
nativity scene did not "taint" the presentation so much as to violate
98
the Establishment Clause.
The majority opinion in Lynch thus offered little concrete
guidance as to what would constitute an unacceptable display in the
next instance. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, however, presented
the first incarnation of a mode of analysis the Court would officially
adopt in County of Allegheny v. ACLU: the "endorsement test." 99
Unlike the majority in Lynch, Justice O'Connor specifically framed the
issue presented as "whether Pawtucket has endorsed Christianity by
its display of the creche." 10 0 She explained, "What is crucial is that a
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message
of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. . . . [P]ractices
having that effect ... make religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community." 10 1 Thus, Justice
O'Connor suggested, state action that appeared to endorse a
particular religious denomination, or religion generally, could not
withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.
The Court officially adopted Justice O'Connor's "endorsement
10 2
test" in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, another holiday display case.
At issue was Allegheny County's placement of a nativity scene in the
county courthouse and a Chanukah menorah "just outside" the CityCounty Building. 0 3 The Court fractured deeply in its treatment of the
displays, and Justice Blackmun's opinion represented a majority in
only three sections. 10 4 That majority did agree, however, on the
centrality of an endorsement analysis: "In recent years, we have paid
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental
practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion, a
concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence."1 0 5 The majority recognized that several recent cases
had used "endorsement" criteria and concluded: "The Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take
a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 686.
Id. at 690; County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 692.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578.
Id.

104. Id.

105. Id. at 592.
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a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political

community.'

"106

Applying the endorsement test, a majority of the Court found
that the nativity scene located in the courthouse constituted an
impermissible religious establishment. 107 The majority concluded that
while "[tihe government may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural
phenomenon, ... under the First Amendment it may not observe it as
a Christian holy day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth
of Jesus."'0 8 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia, dissented in that judgment, strongly
criticizing the majority's endorsement analysis and proposing a more
limited "proselytization test."10 9
In the long run, however, the
endorsement test gained support and has been applied in many
contexts. 110 States may not endorse religion. The Establishment
Clause may serve as a bar against state action as basic as a holiday
display.
III. THE RESULTS OF UNINCORPORATION
Cases like Allegheny illustrate the Justices' willingness to
strike
down
state
actions
as
unconstitutional
religious
1
11
establishments.
If unincorporated, the Establishment Clause could
not serve as an independent justification for challenging such acts. As
discussed earlier, some commentators suggest that application of the
Establishment Clause is not necessary to guarantee individuals'
religious freedom. The next Sections will demonstrate, however, that
proposed, alternative safeguards will not effectively protect against
state establishment.

106. Id. at 593-94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
107. Id. at 601-602.
108. Id. at 601.
109. See id. at 674-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that under the endorsement test, the Court decides cases "using little more than
intuition and a tape measure."),
110. See, e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) ("[N]o reasonable observer
would think a neutral [voucher] program of private choice, where state aid reaches religious
schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals, carries
with it the imprimatur of government endorsement."); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 118 (2001) (finding little danger that schoolchildren would construe meetings held by a
religious club in a public school as government endorsement of religion and finding the school's
discrimination against the club unconstitutional).
111. See supra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
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A. The Limits of Pluralism
Aside from any constitutional protections in place, some
commentators have suggested that limitations on state establishment
are unnecessary in light of the great religious diversity present in the
United States. 12 These commentators claim religious pluralism will
serve as its own check against establishment, with each denomination
interested in checking another's power. 113 Despite a diversity of
faiths, however, recent data reveals the existence of religious
majorities at the county, state, and national levels."1 4 This Section
will examine the extent of these majorities and demonstrate that they
raise serious questions as to the efficacy of pluralism in protecting
115
against state establishment.
Limited information about religious affiliation in the United
States is available from the federal government in the 2000 Statistical
Abstract of the United States. 1 6 Over four-fifths of those surveyed
affiliated themselves with some form of Christianity, and in 1999, a
majority of Americans stated their religious preference as
"Protestant."" 7 Specifically, 55 percent of the population stated their
religious preference as Protestant, 28 percent Catholic, 2 percent
Jewish, 6 percent "Other," and 8 percent "None.""18 Out of the entire

112. See, e.g., Note, supra note 18, at 1717-18.
113. Id. at 1718.
114. See infra notes 116-132 and accompanying text.
115. The collection of religious data presents several difficulties, as "Public Law 94-521
prohibits [the Census Bureau] from asking a question on religious affiliation on a mandatory
U.S. Census Bureau, Religion, at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/religion.htm.
basis."
However, some government information on religious affiliation is available in the United States
at
available
Abstracts,
Statistical
Bureau's
Census
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/statab.html. More detailed information is available from
the Glenmary Research Center in its publication Religious Congregations& Membership in the
United States 2000. See infra notes 130-132. This private organization regularly collects
information on religious adherence by contacting religious organizations in every state. See
http://www.glenmary.org/grc/RCMS_2000/release.htm. Their information is particularly useful
because it breaks down religious affiliation at the local, county, state, and national levels. Yet
even this data cannot be completely accurate to the extent that it relies on religious
organizations to report their own membership and at times may leave for large segments of an
"unclaimed" population that does not belong to a particular religious organization and thus is not
This difficulty, however, works against the possibility of identifying religious
reported.
majorities: many of those individuals in the "unclaimed" category may consider themselves
adherents of a particular faith, even if they are not official members of a congregation. When
this Note refers to a "majority" of religious adherents, it refers to a majority of all citizens,
including the unclaimed population.
116. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2OO1pubs/statab/secOl.pdf.
117. Id. at tbl.75.
118. Id. The category of "None" included those who did not designate a particular affiliation.
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population, 43 percent responded that they had attended a church or
synagogue in the last seven days. 119
Most importantly for the issue of state establishment, another
section of the abstract reveals that in 1990 there were Christian
majorities in twenty-nine of the fifty states. 120 In Utah, the strongest
example, 79.6 percent of the population considered themselves to be
Christian church adherents. 12 1 Several other states had majorities in
the 70 percent range, including Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Dakota, and Rhode Island. 12 2
In addition to the Christian population, the abstract lists each
state's Jewish population as of 1998.123 The contrast is stark. No
state was populated by a Jewish majority. 124
In fact, Jewish
populations constituted less than 10 percent of the population in each
state, nationwide. 125 The highest figures were in New York and New
Jersey, with 9.1 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively. 126 In several
states, Jewish individuals constituted only 0.1 percent of the
population, 127 and on a national level, they composed 2.3 percent. 128
Despite a significant presence in some states, therefore, Jewish
minorities would have a difficult time fighting religious laws proposed
by a Christian majority.
One might argue that a grouping as broad as "Christian" is not
significant, considering the range of views and practices among
different Christian denominations. Yet detailed data from individual
states reveals actual and near-majorities of particular denominations
at the state level. 12 9 According to data from the Glenmary Research
119. Id.
120. Id. at tbl.76. The states that did not contain religious majorities were: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.
121. Id.

122. Id. Numerous states also had majorities in the 60 percent range, including Arkansas,
Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
123. Id. The Jewish population "includes Jews who define themselves as Jewish by religion
as well as those who define themselves as Jewish in cultural terms." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. These states include: Arkansas, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
128. Id.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 130-135. This data is taken from GLENMARY
RESEARCH CENTER, RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS & MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 2000 : AN
ENUMERATION BY REGION, STATE AND COUNTY BASED ON DATA REPORTED FOR 149 RELIGIOUS

BODIES (Dale E. Jones ed., 2002) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS].

2005]

RELIGION IN AN ESTABLISHED STATE

Center, over half of Utah's population in 2000 belonged to the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. 130 Utah is not unique in the high
concentration of one particular sect. Massachusetts and New York
both have large Roman Catholic populations,
constituting
approximately 48.7 percent 131 and 39.8 percent1 32 of each state's
population, respectively. The most interesting state, considering
Madison's concerns in The Federalist 10, is Rhode Island.1 33 Rhode
Island is populated by a majority of Roman Catholic citizens,1 34 and
four out of five counties in the state contain a Catholic majority. One
of those counties was home to the Pawtucket Christmas display
challenged in Lynch. 135
The available figures thus indicate that there are significant
religious majorities at the local and state levels across the country.
Although these majorities obviously do not negate the existence of a
wide variety of faiths in the United States, they do cast serious doubt
upon the claim that religious pluralism will prevent states from
establishing a particular religion or local governments from erecting
religious displays. For example, the Utah majority that belongs to the
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints actually could
proclaim Utah to be the Mormon State.1 36 Rhode Island's Catholic
majority could erect a crucifix outside of the capitol building and
display it year-round. Moreover, the Christian majorities in twentynine states could pass laws requiring their public schools to begin each
day with a general, nondenominational prayer.
Supreme Court jurisprudence reinforces concerns that religious
majorities may institute religious programs over minority opposition.
For example, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe involved a
public school in Texas that permitted student-led, voluntary prayer at
home football games and graduation if a majority of the student body

voted for

it.137

The Court recounted one of the prayers that had been

given at graduation:
The student giving the invocation thanked the Lord for keeping the class safe through
12 years of school and for gracing their lives with two special people and closed: "Lord,

130. See id. at State Report (Utah). Utah's total population in 2000 was 2,233,169, and the
number of adherents to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints was 1,483,858. Id.
131. See id. at State Report (Massachusetts). Massachusetts' total population in 2000 was
6,349,097, and the number of Roman Catholics reported was 3,092,296. Id.
132. See id. at State Report (New York). New York's total population in 2000 was
18,976,457, and the number of Roman Catholics reported was 7,550,491. Id.
133. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
134. See RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS, supra note 129, at State Report (Rhode Island).
135. Id; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
136. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
137. 530 U.S. 290, 296-97 (2000).
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we ask that You keep Your hand upon us during this ceremony and to help us keep You
in our hearts through the rest of our lives. In God's name we pray. Amen."1 38

A majority of the student body also voted to allow a student to say a
prayer before home football games, pursuant to a district policy
39
providing for such elections.1
The Supreme Court, however, invalidated the district's prayer
policy entirely.
The majority reasoned: "[W]hile Santa Fe's
majoritarian election might ensure that most of the students are
represented, it does nothing to protect the minority; indeed, it likely
serves to intensify their offense." 140 One can imagine that a majority
vote offers little consolation to those minorities who feel forced to
choose between events like high school graduation and religious
expression that may clash with their own deeply-held beliefs. Yet in
light of the religious majorities discussed above, state institution of
religious prayers, symbols, or even general Christian tenets is a real
possibility. Religious pluralism will offer little protection against state
establishment in the face of religious majorities. To protect against
state establishment, therefore, individuals will need the assistance of
greater restrictions than the lack of diversity that currently exists in
the states.
B. State ConstitutionalProvisions
Another possibility for protecting religious freedom lies in state
constitutional provisions comparable to the religion clauses of the
First Amendment. 141 Indeed, as school funding cases have attracted
attention over the last few decades, commentators have turned to
state constitutions to see what effect they might have on a state's
decision to offer vouchers or other aid to private schools. 142 Their
results reveal a wide variety of constitutional provisions and different
modes of interpretation at the state level. This Section will examine
the differences among state constitutions, state courts' interpretation
of such religion clauses, and the ability to amend those constitutions.
Due to the real possibility of constitutional change at the state level,

138. Id. at 297 n.4.
139. Id. at 297-98.
140. Id. at 304-05.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
142. See generally Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 ED. LAW
REP. 1 (1997) (surveying state constitutions' positions on the establishment of religion and
related litigation); see Wendtland, supra note 80, at 631 (describing the "more restrictive stance"
of state constitutions vis-A-vis the Federal Constitution with regard to the establishment of
religion).
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this Section argues that the states themselves are unlikely to provide
adequate protection against establishment.
State religion clauses differ in significant ways from their
federal counterparts. State provisions are often more detailed in
describing a desired church-state balance than is the federal
Constitution. 143 For example, in addition to general establishment
bars, some states have constitutional provisions that specifically limit
public aid to religious institutions. 144
In light of such detailed
provisions, many states have indicated that their constitutions provide
for a stricter separation of church and state than does the national
document.' 4 5 For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared in
1971 that the "limitations contained in the Minnesota Constitution
are substantially more restrictive" than those of the federal First
Amendment. 146 The California Supreme Court similarly noted in 1991
that the state constitution provides "additional guarantees that
religion and government shall remain separate" and declared that
"California courts have interpreted the [state religion clause] as being
more protective of the principle of separation than the federal
guarantee."'147 In a 1997 study on state constitutions and school
vouchers, Dr. Frank Kemerer recognized an entire group of states as
148
having "restrictive" constitutional provisions.

143. Wendtland, supra note 80, at 631.
144. See id. at 630-31 ("Every state constitution with a general establishment clause.., also
contains at least one ... more specific constitutional provision[]."). Any limitation on federal aid
to religious institutions is accomplished through the Establishment Clause itself.
145. See id. at 638 ("[T]he more precise the clause, the more likely a state court is to adopt a
stricter church-state standard than the Supreme Court."). For a well-known example, compare
Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) ("Witters f"), with Witters
v. Conm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 373 (Wash. 1989) ("Witters IT'). In Witters II, the
Washington Supreme Court ruled that a state constitutional provision prohibited payments to a
religious school that the United States Supreme Court unanimously permitted in Witters I, 112
Wash. 2d at 373.
146. Ams. United, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, 179 N.W.2d 146, 155 (Minn. 1970)
(upholding the state's reimbursement of transportation costs for parochial school students
against federal and state constitutional challenges).
147. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 820 (Cal. 1991) (plurality opinion)
(holding that invocation of religious prayer during school functions violated the state's
establishment clause (citing Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978))). Two justices
did not join the plurality's state constitutional analysis because they believed the case could be
decided under the federal First Amendment, rather than the state constitution. Id. at 822
(Lucas, J., concurring); id. at 836 (Mosk, J., concurring).
148. Kemerer, supra note 142, at 4. Dr. Kemerer characterizes Michigan as having the most
restrictive religion clause, which was added by referendum in November 1980, after a Michigan
Supreme Court advisory opinion upheld a state statute authorizing funding for religious schools.
Id. at 4. He also characterized as "restrictive" constitutional provisions in Florida, Georgia,
Montana, New York, Oklahoma, Idaho, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. at 6-7.
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The above analysis suggests that unincorporation will not lead
to a uniform increase in church-state ties across the nation. Those
who would rely on state provisions to protect against establishment
may be justified in states such as California, Minnesota, or
Washington, 149 where state courts have interpreted their religion
clauses as providing for a stricter separation of church and state than
that envisioned by the federal document. These states, however, are
but a small fraction of the nation as a whole. Standing in contrast are
eleven states that have "expressly declared" their religion provisions
to provide for limitations on establishment that are no broader than
those of the First Amendment.15 0 What impact unincorporation would
have on these states is unclear.
In fact, many state supreme courts have held that their antiestablishment provisions are to be interpreted as equivalent to the
federal Establishment Clause, despite constitutional language that is
more restrictive than that found in the First Amendment. 15 1 For
example, in a school funding case, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled
that the restrictions of the state constitution were "identical to those
of the First Amendment," 52 even though the state constitution
specifically prohibited "anything in aid of any church.., or to help
support or sustain any school ...controlled by any church."' 53 Thus,
while the state constitution appeared to envision a strict separation of
church and state, the judiciary failed to implement it.
This refusal is not particularly surprising. Case law indicates
that many state founders desired to "go[] no farther" in drafting their
religion clauses than did the Framers in crafting the Bill of Rights. 54
As discussed above, many states at the time of their founding actually
supported various religious groups and were unlikely to provide for
establishment limits any greater than they thought were
constitutionally required. 5 5 In past years, therefore, states like
Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, and Pennsylvania have continued to look
past detailed (and often restrictive) provisions in their constitutions in
order to permit the maximum amount of church-state interaction
allowed at the federal level. 156 If the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court no longer serve as binding precedent on these states, it
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
Wendtland, supra note 80, at 634-35.
Kemerer, supra note 142, at 27.
Id. at 28.
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 3.
Wendtland, supra note 80, at 643 n.96.
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
Wendtland, supra note 80, at 643 n.96.
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is unclear whether their courts will continue to limit church-state
interaction in any meaningful sense.
Most important in understanding the effect of state
constitutional provisions is the public's ability to amend state
constitutions. Even in states where courts are likely to read their
constitutions to prohibit establishment, the possibility remains that
the population will amend the constitution if the Establishment
Clause is unincorporated. It would not be the first time such a step
has been taken: at least one state's citizenry already has amended its
constitution to permit religious aid forbidden by a state court. In
1955, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that tuition payments to
parents of children at religious schools violated the state
In 1956, the state population amended the
constitution. 157
the aid. 158
permit
to
constitution
Citizens may have great success amending state constitutions
partly because state amendment processes are often much less
demanding than the federal amendment process. State constitutions
have been amended with greater frequency than the federal
document, leading some commentators to criticize the process: "State
modes of constitutional reform are usually pointed to as an example
159
of... making it too easy to effect constitutional change."
Unlike the federal system, states generally use one of four
processes to amend their constitutions: constitutional convention,
and
initiative,
popular
amendment,
legislatively-initiated
Eighteen states permit amendment
constitutional commission. 160
proposals via popular initiative, meaning that a certain percentage of
voters may petition for an amendment, which then will be included on
161
the ballot for popular approval.
Although popular initiative is the least common method of
162
amendment, its use and success have increased in recent years.
Significantly, "more of the electorally successful constitutional
The
initiatives have reduced rather than expanded rights."' 63
religious majorities -discussed earlier present a credible threat of
amending state constitutions if the Establishment Clause were to be

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Peter

J.

Galie

&

Christopher

Bopst,

Changing State

Constitutions: Dual

Constitutionalismand the Amending Process, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 27, 29 (1996).

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 32.
at 46.
at 47.
at 48 (quoting Janice May, The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?, in

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES 166-167 (Stanley Friedelbaum ed., 1988)).
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unincorporated. Some states, like Massachusetts, have recognized
and attempted to avoid this problem by prohibiting the use of popular
initiative to create religious change. 164 Yet the popular initiative
process, along with other amendment techniques, remains available in
many states.
Religious majorities there may choose to utilize
relatively easy amendment processes to "experiment" with religion as
165
foretold by Justice Thomas.
A survey of state constitutional provisions thus indicates that
local governments are unlikely to serve as effective protectors against
religious establishment. Many state courts already refuse to interpret
their constitutions as suggested by the plain meaning of the text.
Without federal guidance and binding limitations, it is unclear what
restrictions, if any, state courts will impose on establishment. Even if
state courts enforce such limitations, moreover, constitutional
amendment processes have been used in the past and can provide a
real threat to religious liberty. The religious majorities in twenty-nine
states may have ultimate control over establishment through their
166
ability to remove state establishment provisions.
C. Established Limits and the Free Exercise Clause
Some scholars suggest that unincorporation will have little
impact on government action because the Free Exercise Clause alone
will protect religious freedom. 167 Although the Free Exercise Clause
may protect against certain kinds of government actions, this Section
proposes that significant obstacles remain to using the Clause to
prevent various kinds of establishment. This difficulty is particularly
true in the case of no coercive establishments like the holiday displays
168
challenged in Allegheny.
Plaintiffs who attempt to challenge state establishments under
169
the Free Exercise Clause will face a substantial standing hurdle.
The Court's current jurisprudence significantly limits a plaintiffs
ability to bring establishment challenges, even under an incorporated
Establishment Clause. To demonstrate her standing to bring suit, a
164. See id. at 51 (describing state measures limiting the use of popular initiatives to change
constitutional provisions concerning religion).
165. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
166. See supra note 120.
167. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
169. Numerous commentators have criticized the Court's current standing doctrine. See
generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article I1, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (criticizing certain applications of the "injury in-fact"
standing requirement).
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plaintiff must show that she has suffered an injury in fact that is
fairly traceable to and likely to be redressed by favorable government
171
action. 170 This can be particularly difficult in establishment cases.
For example, in the 1982 case Valley Forge ChristianCollege v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the Court
denied that Americans United for Separation of Church and State
("Americans United") had standing to sue under the Establishment
Clause. 172 Americans United had challenged a decision by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to dispose of unused
government property by giving it to the Valley Forge Christian
College. 73 In the original complaint, the group described itself as an
organization composed of 90,000 "taxpayer members" and claimed
that each member would be deprived of the constitutional use of her
tax dollar by the government's impermissible donation to the religious
institution.174
The District Court originally dismissed the complaint after
finding that Americans United lacked standing. 75 A divided panel in
the Third Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment. 76 Rejecting
the taxpayer standing theory asserted in the complaint, the Circuit
Court found that the respondents had standing by virtue of their
positions as "citizens."'' 77 The court ruled that all had suffered an "
'injury in fact' to their shared individuated right to a government that
'shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion.' "178
Writing separately, one judge explained that he believed standing in
such a case was necessary to fulfill "the need for an available
plaintiff," without which "the Establishment Clause would be
rendered virtually unenforceable."'1 79
The Supreme Court rejected what it called the Circuit Court's
"unusually broad and novel view of standing."'18 0
The majority
explained that standing requirements are not satisfied by "abstract
injury in nonobservance of the Constitution."' 8'1
The Court also
rejected the contention that the "psychological consequence" of an
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Lujan v. Defender- of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
Ams. United v. U.S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 267-68 (1980).
454 U.S. 464, 489-90 (1982).
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ams. United v. U.S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 261(1980)).
Ams. United, 619 F.2d at 267, 268.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 482 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm., 94 U.S. 208, 223 (1974)).
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unconstitutional act rose to the level of injury in fact and concluded
that respondents had failed to allege a personal injury.1 8 2 Finally, the
Court explained, "expenditure of public funds in an allegedly
unconstitutional manner is not an injury sufficient to confer standing,
even though the plaintiff contributes to the public coffers as a
83
taxpayer."
If it is difficult to obtain standing under the Court's current
jurisprudence, one can only imagine how challenging it would be to
bring establishment-like claims under the Free Exercise Clause. This
difficulty exists even for establishments that surely would be struck
down under the Court's current jurisprudence. For example, how
would one frame a challenge against the Allegheny creche? Valley
Forge makes clear that the "psychological" injury of the symbol will
not suffice to constitute an injury in fact. l8 4 Furthermore, the creche
does not create the type of injury or disability typically present in free
exercise cases; the display does not force any individual to engage in
18 5
any religious activity or prohibit her from doing so.
One might argue that protection of one's free exercise of
religion would guard against forced exposure to religious symbols that
serve as the government's endorsement of a particular faith. This
argument would be a difficult one to make under the Court's current
jurisprudence. In Braunfeld v. Brown the Court upheld a Sunday
closing law, explaining: "The statute before us does not make criminal
the holding of any religious belief or opinion, nor does it force anyone
to embrace any religious belief or to say or believe anything in conflict
with his religious tenets."'1 6 Furthermore, the Court recently rejected
a challenge to a Washington state scholarship program that permitted
students to engage in any course of study except theology. 8 7 There
the Court noted that any disfavor of religion evidenced in the statute
182. Id. at 485.
183. Id. at 477. In the later case Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court clarified that there was no
standing in Valley Forge because "the challenge was to an exercise of executive authority
pursuant to the Property Clause of Article IV, § 3." 487 U.S. 589, 619 (1988). Only two cases
after Valley Forge, Bowen and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), found taxpayer
standing to challenge a federal statute on establishment clause grounds. Nancy C. Staudt,
Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 628-29 (2004). For purposes of this Note, the focus is
not whether taxpayers may challenge action under the Taxing and Spending Clause or the
Property Clause but what sorts of injuries are sufficient to confer standing in the first place. If
establishment itself cannot be recognized as an injury, as would be the case if the Establishment
Clause were unincorporated, plaintiffs must show some injury to their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause.
184. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485.
185. See infra notes 186-189 and accompanying text.
186. 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961) (plurality opinion).
187. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
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was "of a far milder kind" than that found unconstitutional in past
cases.18 8 The statute did not impose criminal or civil sanctions on any
type of religious practice, did not deny religious officials the ability to
participate in local government, and did not force individuals to choose
between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.1 8 9
Thus, the Court found no Free Exercise problem in the statute at
hand. 190
Like the Washington program, the Allegheny creche does not
force anyone to engage in any religious activities, nor does it prohibit
any individual from receiving a government benefit. The same would
be true if Utah simply proclaimed itself "the Mormon State," provided
it did not use that designation to limit citizens' ability to choose their
own form of worship. To the extent that an establishment is "noncoercive," therefore, it is not clear how individuals could challenge that
action under the Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause
functions in a way other provisions are unlikely to duplicate. 191
D. Substantive Due Process
If religious diversity and state constitutions are unlikely to
protect against state establishment, one might turn to the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause for direct protection. Such an
192
approach finds support in CaroleneProducts'famous footnote four.
There, the Court acknowledged that "[t]here may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
' 193
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments."
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the need to pay special
attention to "statutes directed at particular religious ... or racial
minorities,"' 194 as the threat of "prejudice against discrete and insular
188. Id. at 720.
189. Id. at 720-21.
190. Id. at 725.
191. As the Court made clear in Locke, moreover, the determination that a government
action is constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause has a large impact on a plaintiffs ability
to bring a successful challenge under the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 721 n.3 (stating
that the Court will apply rational-basis scrutiny to statutes that satisfy the Free Exercise
clause); see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (same). The difficulty of
bringing an establishment-type challenge under the Free Exercise Clause thus makes it difficult
to bring an equal protection challenge. Furthermore, as in the case of Free Exercise challenges,
plaintiffs bringing equal protection claims against non-coercive establishments likely will have a
difficult time showing an actual injury in fact necessary for standing.
192. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 153.

326

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:301

minorities... may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." 195 In short, the Court foresaw the dangers that could be
posed by religious majorities and was ready to guard against them.
Despite the attractiveness of using substantive due process as
a safeguard against state establishment, however, there are serious
challenges to using this doctrine should the Establishment Clause be
unincorporated. First, the same standing problems discussed in
connection with claims under the Free Exercise Clause 196 will likely
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment as well. Unless individuals
are forced to or prohibited from engaging in religious activity, it will
be difficult to obtain standing in court. 197
Second, if the Court decides to unincorporate the
Establishment Clause, it likely will be based on a conclusion that no
protection of state establishment was intended at the time of the
founding or the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. 198 After
concluding that the Framers and citizenry did not intend to protect
against state religious establishment, however, it seems unlikely that
the Court would then find such protection to be a fundamental right to
be safeguarded by substantive due process.
Finally, debate over what liberties are protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment is ongoing and heated.199 The Court has been
200
reluctant to expand the notion of liberty in many contexts.
Although substantive due process appears to be an attractive
safeguard against state establishment, therefore, significant obstacles

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
See supra notes 169-183 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 24-30, 50-69 and accompanying text.

199. One might take as an example the passage from Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey that reasoned: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State." 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). A majority of the Court quoted this passage with
approval in the recent decision Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). Justice Scalia's
dissent, however, strongly criticized the Court for using such language:
[I]f the Court is referring not to the holding of Casey, but to the dictum of its famed
sweet-mystery-of-life passage: That 'casts some doubt' upon either the totality of our
jurisprudence or else (presumably the right answer) nothing at all. I have never heard
of a law that attempted to restrict one's 'right to define' certain concepts; and if the
passage calls into question the government's power to regulate actions based on one's
self-defined 'concept of existence, etc.,' it is the passage that ate the rule of law.
Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). Even in the most recent decisions,
therefore, substantive due process is a topic of much debate.
200. See Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1494 (2002)
(describing the difficulties associated with the assertion of liberty claims).
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remain to using the Fourteenth Amendment to guard against state
establishment directly.
IV. GOVERNMENT SPEECH AND THE DANGER OF ESTABLISHED
RELIGION

As the foregoing Sections have demonstrated, unincorporation
of the Establishment Clause is likely to have a significant impact on
the way states treat religion. Suggested alternative protections, such
as pluralism, state constitutions, and substantive due process, are
unlikely to provide the level of protection currently guaranteed. Of
course, one might suggest that current treatment of the
Establishment Clause is too strict in the first place. Perhaps states
should be able to establish religions within their borders. In contrast
to such arguments, Part IV of this Note utilizes recent scholarly work
regarding government speech to demonstrate that recognized
problems of government speech are especially troubling in the context
of religion. The next Sections will argue, therefore, that a general rule
against state establishment is necessary to protect religious freedom
and choice in a system of democratic government.
A. The Government as Speaker
The American government speaks. 20 1 Although it may seem
strange to think of it in such terms, the government communicates its
views much like any individual does through words or actions. 202
Unlike the speech of most individuals, however, government speech
may take the form of criminal codes, taxes, and public education
curriculum, easily reaching a large audience through far-reaching
programs. The government's ability to speak in such a powerful
manner may allow it to monopolize entire areas of debate, 20 3 disguise
opinions as objective truth or facts, 20 4 and generally limit discussion in
the marketplace of ideas. 20 5 As Professor Mark Yudof explained in his
201. See Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1380 (2001) (describing the modes of speech of modern democratic
governments).
202. See generally Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of
Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 862 (1979) (developing a
framework for analyzing government speech under the First Amendment).
203. See infra notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 243-251 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 239-240 and accompanying text.
208. Yudof, supra note 202, at 865.

328

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1:301

seminal article on government speech, "[t]he power to teach, inform,
and lead is also the power to indoctrinate, distort judgment, and
20 8
perpetuate the current regime."
Although government speech is not a new phenomenon,
scholars are still working to develop a basic theory of its power,
consequences, and limitations. 2 9 The issue first arrived on center
stage in Yudofs 1979 article, When Governments Speak: Toward a
Theory of Government Expression and the FirstAmendment. 210 Other
scholars have since turned to the topic, 211 but the many forms of
government speech and the lack of clear constitutional provisions
addressing them have made principled guidelines difficult to
develop. 212 Since guidance from the Court has not been readily
forthcoming, moreover, some scholars have suggested that the
Justices also have yet to formulate a clear theory of government
speech under the Constitution. 213
Two principles do arise from recent cases. First, as the Court
explained in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia, "when the government appropriates public funds to promote
21 4
a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes."
Second, when the government creates a "forum" for public speech, it
may not exclude speech based on viewpoint if such a distinction is not
based on the purposes of the forum. 21 5 Unfortunately, the dichotomy
between government speech and government forums leaves
unresolved the most difficult issues of government expression. It
raises questions as to what happens when the very act of government
speech limits individual freedom, monopolizes the marketplace of
ideas, and interferes with individuals' First Amendment rights. 21 6 In
these gray areas, in particular, government speech provides insight
into the function and necessity of the Establishment Clause.

209. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 201, at 1385 (referring to the "still-inchoate character
of the government speech idea").
210. Yudof, supra note 202.
211. See, e.g., Bezanson & Buss, supra note 201, at 1344.
212. See, e.g., id. at 1384, 1508 (focusing on eight forms of government speech and asserting
that authority for this speech must be found in other provisions of the Constitution).
213. See id. at 1382-83 (noting that "[tihe Supreme Court's opinions hint at the answers to
some of these [government speech] questions, self-consciously evade others, and simply ignore
most").
214. 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
215. Id. at 829.
216. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 201, at 1381 (suggesting that the expansion of
government speech creates an elevated risk of government monopolization of private speech,
which in turn leads to an increased number of First Amendment challenges).
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B. To Speak or Not to Speak: Rust and Rosenberger

One of the first challenges in government speech cases is
determining whether the government is actually speaking. At times it
is obvious that the government has made a statement; one generally
does not question what entity created the criminal laws or tax code.
In other instances, however, the identity of the speaker is far from
clear.
For example, courts have faced significant difficulties
determining who is speaking in state programs that provide for
"Choose Life," but not "Choose Choice," license plates. 217 In these
kinds of cases, the outcome often depends largely on whether the
special plates are considered government or individual speech, but
that determination can be difficult to make. 218
A similar question of speaker identity arose in Rosenberger.219
There, students at the University of Virginia challenged the
University's decision not to pay publication fees for their Christian
newspaper, despite funding other groups' similar, nonreligious
activities. 220 The majority and dissent disagreed upon who actually
spoke in the newspaper.
The dissent would have upheld the
University's decision to prohibit the funding, viewing the aid as
government endorsement that would support religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause. 221 The majority, on the other hand, found
that the University's funding scheme created a "public forum" in
which private individuals and organizations spoke with the help of
government aid. 222 The majority thus rejected the University's
Establishment Clause concerns, ruling that it was unconstitutional to
deny students funding based on their religious status. 223
In doing so, the majority reinforced basic First Amendment
principles limiting government censorship and prohibiting the
imposition of financial burdens based on the content of one's

217. See, e.g., Anne Paine, Needed Sign-ups for 'Choose Life' Plates Turned In, THE
TENNESSEAN, Jan. 13, 2004 (reporting on the ACLU's challenge to Tennessee's "Choose Life"
license plates).
218. See Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2002), remanded to 281 F. Supp.
2d 866, 876 (E.D. La. 2003). The Louisiana District Court in Henderson concluded that the
"prestige" license plates were not government speech but rather a nonpublic forum requiring
viewpoint neutrality. 281 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
219. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825-26 (1995).
220. Id. at 827.
221. Id. at 863-64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 829.
223. See id. at 845-46 (holding that the denial of funds "was a denial of the right of free
speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine
the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires").
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expression. 224
The Court reaffirmed the recognized ban on
government viewpoint discrimination, even when the private speech
occurs in a "limited public forum. '225 The government may not limit
the content of speech in such a forum, even if it funds the speech or
owns the property where the speech occurs. 22 6
The Court in
Rosenberger thus protected individual expression from viewpoint
discrimination, provided that the government had opened a forum for
individuals to speak generally.
While the Court took pains to protect a wide range of
viewpoints in Rosenberger, its decision in Rust v. Sullivan allowed the
government great latitude to limit private speech when done in the
context of a government program. 227 Rust involved regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services under
Title X of the Public Health Service Act. 228 The Act itself instructed
that no funds appropriated under its family-planning services be used
"in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."229 The
Secretary interpreted the words "family planning" to include only
"preventative family planning services" and specified that no Title X
project could provide counseling about abortion as a family planning
technique. 230 Department regulations also prohibited health care
providers from referring a pregnant woman to an abortion provider,
"even upon specific request." 23 1
Grantees receiving Title X funds and doctors who supervised
the funds' administration challenged the regulations on numerous
bases, including First Amendment grounds. 232 They claimed the
regulations constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by
prohibiting employees from discussing abortion and compelling them
to provide information about continuing a pregnancy. 2 33 Relying on
previous cases such as Maher v. Roe, 234 the Court disagreed and ruled
that the government "may make a value judgment" favoring childbirth
over abortion. 235 More broadly, it held: "The Government can, without
224.
Bd., 502
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 828-29 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
U.S. 105, 115 (1991)).
Id. at 829.
Id. at 829-30.
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 177-78.
10 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1991).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 192.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93 (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
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violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage
certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the
same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with
the problem in another way." 236 In short, the Court ruled that the
government may speak and use individual citizens as its mouthpiece.
Indeed, the Court in Rust rejected petitioners' claims that the
regulations violated the First Amendment rights of Title X employees.
The majority reasoned that these employees remained free to pursue
"abortion-related activities" in their free time and that the limitations
imposed on their speech were an acceptable consequence of the
decision to accept employment in a Title X program. 2 37 Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, found this section
of the majority opinion particularly troubling: "[I]t has never been
sufficient to justify an otherwise unconstitutional condition [here,
waiver of First Amendment rights] upon public employment that the
238
employee may escape the condition by relinquishing his or her job."
The dissenting Justices viewed the regulations as impermissible
found
them
and
would
have
viewpoint
discrimination
239
unconstitutional.
Rosenberger and Rust thus present an interesting dichotomy.
When the government creates a forum for public speech, it may not
place content-based limitations on the views expressed in that forum.
On the other hand, when the government retains complete control
over a particular program, it may force individual citizens to promote
its chosen views as a condition of employment. The government may
speak freely so long as it leaves no room for public debate in a
program. As the next Section suggests, the consequences of this
dichotomy in the context of government and religion are troubling.
C. The Dangers of Rust and Religion
As one might imagine, Rust was a controversial decision. The
controversy was due in some part to its relation to the ongoing
Aside from that controversy, however,
abortion debate. 240
commentators have found the case troubling for what it demonstrates
about government speech.
Professors Randall P. Bezanson and

236. Id. at 193.
237. Id. at 198-99.
238. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 209-11 ("[Olur cases make clear that ideological viewpoint is a... repugnant
ground upon which to base funding decisions.").
240. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 201, at 1396-97.
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William G. Buss provide a helpful summary of the problems caused by
government expression:
[T]he use of speech by government... presents heightened risks that the government
may displace or monopolize private speech by inserting its voice in the speech
marketplace, employing devices to conceal hidden government messages in private
speech, or distorting the gatekeeping functions of private speakers through leverage,
2 1
inducement, or direct government ownership of channels of expression. 4

The next subsections will use the Rust decision to examine two
recognized problems of government speech that are particularly
troubling in the context of religion: government monopoly over
expression and hidden speakers delivering a government message.

1. Government Monopolies
Rust presents an excellent example of the government's ability
to monopolize an issue of debate for an entire segment of the
population. The Title X program challenged in Rust educated poor
women about birth control. 24 2 Many of the women using the program's
services could not afford any other medical care, making them entirely
dependent on the government's advice as given by Title X employees.
Commentators have recognized this kind of monopoly to be
particularly dangerous. When the government controls an area so
tightly that other viewpoints may not be discussed or must be
criticized, 243 it effectively shuts down the "marketplace of ideas"
protected by the First Amendment. 244 It creates a situation in which
an individual's ability to make independent choices, and society's
ability to engage in discourse to find the "best" answer, is limited. For
the women in Rust, abortion was not an option because the
government refused to discuss it.
One does not have to search far to imagine a similar monopoly
in the context of government and religion. This threat would be posed
by the insertion of religion into public schools. If the Establishment
Clause were incorporated, as discussed above, states would be able to
implement daily prayer or other religious activities in public
classrooms. This provides the state with a particularly effective
means of installing chosen religious values, as parents unable to
241. Id. at 1381.
242. See infra notes 227, 231 and accompanying text.
243. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (noting that the regulations required Title X staff, when
questioned about abortion, to reply that " 'the project does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning and ... does not counsel or refer for abortion.' ").
244. See Yudof, supra note 202, at 872 (examining different approaches plaintiffs could take
in raising First Amendment challenges).
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afford private education would find their children subject to state245
imposed religious messages.
2. Hidden Speakers
The government speech in Rust also was troubling because the
women involved may not have realized that they were hearing a
restricted message from the government, rather than an objective
portrayal of their medical alternatives. 247 As Bezanson and Buss
explain, "The argument is not that poor women are entitled to free
abortion counseling. It is, instead, that they are entitled not to be
misled into thinking that they are receiving unadulterated medical
advice when that is not the case." 248 By using individual citizens as
mouthpieces, the government may conceal itself as speaker and lead
an audience to believe that a message is objective truth as opposed to
a biased opinion.
The government's actions as a hidden speaker thus limit the
marketplace of ideas with the added danger of giving no indication
that the government is doing so. Yudof warns: "[Government speech]
distorts the judgment of citizens, advocates undemocratic or
unconstitutional values, violates the right of citizens not to be called
on to pay taxes to support expression that they find objectionable, or
drowns out opposing messages by virtue of the government's ability to
capture the listening audience." 249 When taken to an extreme, Yudof
also suggests that government communication may distort the entire
democratic process to ensure an administration's re-election, and
250
citizens may never realize that they have heard a partisan message.
Again, this distortion is particularly troubling in the context of
religion. State governments may use religious organizations to speak
on their behalf without citizens recognizing that they have received
political messages as opposed to spiritual advice. In his discussion of
religion
at
the
founding,
Michael
McConnell
explains:
245. Depending on the form of the prayer, moreover, such parents are unlikely to find
redress in the courts. As noted above, serious difficulties face plaintiffs seeking standing for
various Establishment Clause claims. See supra notes 170-183 and accompanying text.
247. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 201, at 1397 (suggesting that the Court in Rust may
have held differently had they found that the women believed they were invited into a family
planning service).
248. Id.
249. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 204 (1983).

250. See Yudof, supra note 202, at 871-72.
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"[E]stablishment of religion ... enable[s] the government to control
the institutions for dissemination of opinions and ideas, to suppress
ideas dangerous to the regime, and to encourage ideas supportive of
' 25 1
the regime.
Indeed, the government in an established state may attempt to
suppress faiths that "present threats to the legitimacy" of the current
state and "use religion as a supplementary means of social control,
just as authoritarian regimes in our day use a government-controlled
press." 252
An established church may provide "the power to
indoctrinate, distort judgment, and perpetuate the current regime," as
Yudof fears. 253 McConnell, by no means an opponent of religion, also
recognizes the ability of political regimes to use established religion to
inculcate values it finds "useful for civic ends." 254 In the wrong hands,
an established religion may be abused to limit the democratic process
by presenting political ideas as moral imperatives. 255
The
government's ability to hide its speech behind what appears to be
spiritual advice would provide an extremely powerful means for
controlling citizens.
3. The Establishment Clause as a Limit on Government Speech
Rust thus illustrates some of the dangers posed by government
expression and the difficulties caused by the fact that the Constitution
is generally silent on the issue of government speech. 256 Such speech
may limit severely the chances of informed discussion through which
citizens can arrive at the answers they believe are best for themselves
and their nation. 257 This ability to disagree and debate is particularly
important in the context of religion. Professors Stephen Holmes and
Cass Sunstein explain:
Religious liberty is one of the central means by which the multidenominational United
States handles its inner diversity. Our pluralistic society, we might say, is held together
by a division. The 'barrier' between church and state has a positive, not merely a
negative, function. It permits and encourages common citizenship despite religious
pluralism, allowing citizens to disagree about ultimate matters while concurring on
penultimate ones. Americans can disagree about 'the good' (that is, the personal and

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

McConnell, supra note 24, at 2183.
Id.
Yudof, supra note 202, at 865.
McConnell, supra note 24, at 2183.
Yudof, supra note 202, at 865.
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 201, at 1396-97.
Yudof, supra note 202, at 869.
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religious ideals they deem worth pursuing), while agreeing about 'the right' (the rules of
justice that govern non-violent coexistence and cooperation... ).258

To some extent, the United States functions as it does because it is not
constantly torn between opposing factions in a battle for official
religious control. Rust was controversial largely because it dealt with
abortion. As Holmes and Sunstein recognize, religion is likely to
provoke the same sort of passionate and divided responses.
Indeed, the First Amendment recognizes the significance of
religious expression. It singles out religious "speech"-free exercisefor protection.
Even more importantly, the First Amendment
specifically limits the government's ability to speak about religion.
Yudof explains: "[T]he establishment clause is special, for it may be
the only substantive constitutional restraint on what governments
may say. '259 Without the Establishment Clause, public holiday
displays and similar government speech likely will be governed by the
Court's ruling in Rust: "The Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way. '260 Much in the same way that the
government can choose childbirth over abortion, Allegheny County
could pick Christianity over Judaism or Methodist over Baptist
beliefs.
The problems of monopoly and disguised speakers are
particularly troubling in the context of religion.
The First
Amendment recognizes this, limiting the government's religious
speech while protecting that of individuals. This balance would be lost
under unincorporation.
As Yudof recognizes, the Establishment
Clause is special. Its protections are unlikely to be duplicated and are
central to the balance of government and religion in United States.
V. CONCLUSION

The Establishment Clause plays an important role in the
American constitutional structure. Currently it guards against official
school prayers, certain religious displays, direct funding of religious
schools, and much more. 261 All of these protections are at risk if the
Establishment Clause is unincorporated. Yet numerous judges and
258. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS
ON TAXES 186 (1999).
259. Yudof, supra note 202, at 875.
260. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
261. See supra notes 103-108, 137-140 and accompanying text.
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commentators have advocated doing just that. 262 Support for this view
appears to be growing, 263 although commentators still debate the
impact unincorporation would have on the current system of religious
liberty. This Note proposes that other constitutional and practical
safeguards will be insufficient to protect against state-imposed
religion in the same way the Establishment Clause does currently.
Despite the variety of religious faiths in the nation as a whole,
there are significant religious majorities at the state and local levels.
These majorities increase the likelihood that states will establish
preferences for particular religions, or religion generally, after
unincorporation.
They also make it possible to amend state
constitutional provisions that may stand in their way. As discussed
earlier, the state amendment process generally is much easier than
that of the federal Constitution, and it already has been used
264
successfully to increase state aid to religious institutions.
Moreover, the Court's current vision of free exercise also is
unlikely to provide protection against state establishments. First,
plaintiffs may find it very difficult to obtain standing to bring suit
under the Free Exercise Clause. Second, the Court's current vision of
the Clause seems unlikely to offer protection against various types of
no coercive establishment. Substantive due process, while a good
candidate for protecting religious liberty generally, poses similar
standing problems and is unlikely to be favored if the Court does
decide to unincorporate.
Thus, individuals are likely to receive significantly less
protection against government establishment if courts unincorporate
the Establishment Clause. The dangers present in this situation are
evident when viewed in the context of government speech, which
raises the specter of monopolies and hidden bias. These problems are
particularly dangerous in the context of religion. The public school
system provides states with a captive audience for religious messages.
More importantly, governments may abuse established religion as a
means of social control, undermining the marketplace of ideas. As
recognized over half a century ago in Everson,265 both government and
religion stand to lose from their unity.
Individuals stand to lose as well. The Establishment Clause
recognizes that there is injury in being forced to live in "the Mormon
State" or observe a nativity scene every time one walks into the county

262.
263.
264.
265.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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courthouse. Current limitations on establishment serve important
functions by protecting individuals' religious freedom and limiting
government speech. Unincorporation is inconsistent with the vision of
liberty first proposed in the Bill of Rights and reaffirmed in the
Fourteenth Amendment. It threatens serious consequences likely to
have a negative impact on the nation as a whole. To avoid the
dangers foretold in Everson,266 therefore, the Establishment Clause
must remain an effective bar against government speech and the
imposition of religious values on citizens both nationally and in the
states.
Kathryn Elizabeth Komp
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